Above Security is the inaugural sponsor of the Insider Threat Matrix
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Use case
The riskiest data movements don’t involve anyone pasting anything. An autonomous AI agent, granted broad OAuth scope by a single employee click, reads Drive, Slack, or your CRM at machine pace — and reproduces the result on a vendor’s servers. The consent is the move. The data is the result.
Fischer prepared every line before it was played. He didn't react — he saw the move before it landed. The defender's edge in an agentic world is the same: preparation, not reaction.
See every OAuth grant to an external AI agent — by employee, by scope, by vendor — at the moment of consent.
One confirmed case: 10 slides of board-confidential strategy reproduced on a foreign agent's servers two days before the actual board meeting.
Decide which AI tools belong in your environment — with the evidence, not the marketing copy.
You run security at a company where engineers, product managers, sellers, and exec assistants are all installing AI tools that ask for OAuth access to corporate systems. Most are well-governed enterprise AI. A small number are autonomous agents from vendors you've never heard of, asking for full read access to your Workspace, your Slack, your CRM — and getting it.
The OAuth consent screen is a small grey window in the corner of a busy browser. The employee clicks “Allow” because that’s what consent screens are for. The autonomous agent now has machine-pace, persistent access to corporate data — long after the human has logged off, and long after they remember granting it. Existing controls were built for humans on devices, not for tokens on a vendor’s server.
01
Above's investigative agents observe the consent screen, the scopes requested, and the vendor on the other end — so a grant to a vendor outside your approved list reaches the security team in minutes, not next quarter's access review.
02
When an autonomous agent reproduces a confidential file on its vendor's servers, the investigation ties the reproduction back to the consent that enabled it — so the exfiltration is attributable to the employee, the agent, the consent, and the file, not to “an AI tool somewhere.”
03
Some agentic AI is exactly the productivity gain it advertises. Others are a long-running, broadly-scoped read into your corporate data. The investigation gives you the evidence to allow one and revoke the other — so the AI-tool inventory is decided on what the agent actually does, not on what its homepage claims.
The risk isn't the AI tool. The risk is the OAuth scope. When an employee clicks “Allow” on a consent screen for an autonomous agent, they grant that agent persistent, machine-pace read access to corporate systems — Drive, Slack, CRM, Workspace — that the employee themselves only used at human pace. The agent now reads at the speed of an API, on the vendor's servers, indefinitely. The insider-risk umbrella covers agentic insiders explicitly: an AI agent acting on behalf of an employee is itself a class of insider, and a broadly-scoped agent on an unknown vendor is exactly the kind of insider security needs to see.
DLP fires on data movement; the agent doesn't move files, it reads them in place. UEBA fires on deviation from a behavioral baseline; the agent's reads are programmatic, not user-driven, so they don't appear in user-behavior baselines at all. The Workspace and identity-provider admin consoles show the grant happened, but not what the agent read after the grant. Neither category was designed for a third party with machine-pace access on the user's behalf. It requires continuous behavioral investigation that connects the consent event to the consequence on the vendor's side.
Above's investigative agents observe the consent screen at the moment of click — the employee, the vendor, the scopes requested, the corporate systems exposed. When data subsequently appears on the vendor's servers (a reproduced document, an enumerated channel list, an exported CRM segment), the investigation ties that consequence back to the consent. The output is a structured investigation: timeline, contextual analysis, reasoning, recommended actions — including which OAuth grants to revoke, which AI tools to allow-list, and which employees to talk to.
