Above Security is the inaugural sponsor of the Insider Threat Matrix
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Use case
Most insider risk is unintentional. A small fraction isn’t. The hardest cases are the ones where access is legitimate, behaviour looks normal on the surface, and the activity quietly serves an interest other than yours — a side venture, a competitor, a future employer, a third party.
Kasparov played both sides of the board at once. He understood that the position you appear to be in is not the position you are actually in — and he chose the move that exploited the gap.
Spot the parallel commercial venture inside the day job — not after it incorporates.
Surface employer-funded compute running personal research, papers, or product R&D.
Quantify the IP transfer before the public launch — not after the press release.
You’re a security or legal leader at a company whose engineers, researchers, or commercial team have legitimately broad access to high-value systems — your research platform, your training environment, your CRM, your customer pipeline. Most of them use that access exactly as intended. A small number don’t — and on the surface they look identical to the ones who do.
The signal of a malicious insider isn’t one big event. It’s the combination — a personal AI project named after a private company, a public repo built on corporate compute, a customer list quietly exported, an incorporated entity surfacing in a chat history. None of it trips a policy, because nothing they’re touching is forbidden. The intent is in the pattern, not the action — and the pattern is what continuous behavioural investigation is built to see.
01
Above’s investigative agents stitch together activity across systems and time, surface the combination, and tell you what the day job looks like next to what the person is actually doing — so you respond to an intent pattern, not to one orphan event.
02
Two people can have identical access logs and opposite intentions. The investigation tells them apart with evidence — and tells you which conversation each one belongs in: HR coaching for the misaligned, legal for the malicious.
03
Each finding is a timestamped, attributed event chain ready for legal, HR, and security to act on together — so the response happens at the speed of the evidence, not the speed of the headline.
No. The vast majority of insider activity is negligent or unintentional — the insider-risk umbrella reflects that, covering negligent, compromised, malicious, and agentic insiders. What turns unusual activity into malicious-insider risk is the combination: legitimate access being used in service of an agenda the company didn’t sign up for. Intent isn’t the gate of the investigation — it’s the difference between an HR coaching conversation and a legal one.
DLP fires on data movement against predefined policies — but the malicious insider isn’t moving prohibited data, they’re moving exactly the data their role allows them to move. UEBA fires on deviation from a behavioural baseline — but a high-performing insider with an agenda often looks like better baseline performance, not a deviation. Both categories assume the threat can be predefined as a rule or an anomaly. The malicious-insider pattern is a multi-week behavioural arc that only continuous behavioural investigation can surface.
Above’s investigative agents reconstruct the activity across systems and time — what was accessed, what was created, what was named after what, what surfaced in a chat history that didn’t belong to the day job. The output is a structured investigation: timeline, contextual analysis, reasoning, recommended actions — ready for security, HR, and legal to act on together, with the response calibrated to the pattern, not the personality.
