“The sign-in was valid”
MFA was satisfied, the access was allowed and nothing broke a rule. On paper the attacker is the employee.
When an attacker signs in as one of your people, everything they do looks like that person's work. Above investigates the account across identity, SaaS and endpoint and answers the first question: is this the employee, or someone using their access?

INC-026A finance analyst's account
Confirmed threatAn intruder takes over a finance analyst's mailbox
Response Reset sessions and MFA
of insider incidents involve stolen credentials. Ponemon Institute, 2026 Cost of Insider Risks.
per credential-theft incident, the costliest insider type. Ponemon Institute, 2026 Cost of Insider Risks.
of breaches begin with credential abuse. Verizon 2026 Data Breach Investigations Report.
MFA was satisfied, the access was allowed and nothing broke a rule. On paper the attacker is the employee.
An impossible-travel alert means little until you know whether the person is traveling, just changed roles or has never worked at that hour.
Without context, the first suspect is the person whose name is on the account. Getting that wrong costs trust and slows the real response.
Above investigative agents
Ready for security, HR, and legal to act on together.
Ready for security, HR, and legal to act on together.
Not really MeganINC-026 · A finance analyst's account
Confirmed threatEvery step used Megan's valid sign-in, so nothing broke a rule.
A new device abroad after MFA fatigue, the forwarding rule, the app grant and the bank-details reply, against Megan's own MacBook and hours.
A human confirms
At a Nasdaq-listed company, the partner portal recorded a partner issuing a gift card. Above showed it was a sales rep, and that the card went to him.
A solutions engineer walks you through a real case.
Hours, devices, places and data, against the person's own history.
MFA, devices and grants from your identity provider, in one timeline.
The employee or someone else, and what to revoke and reset.
Evidence this investigation reads
Read together, they show whether the person behind the account changed.
Okta,
Microsoft Entra
Repeated prompts, odd-hour approvals, reset methods.
Okta,
Ping
Never seen for this person, right before unusual activity.
Okta,
Google Workspace
The owner working while another session runs elsewhere.
Microsoft Entra,
Google Workspace
Mail or file access granted minutes after a risky sign-in.
Gmail,
Microsoft Outlook
Rules that hide replies or forward mail outside.
Google Drive
Far beyond the person's own history.
CrowdStrike, Microsoft Defender
From your EDR, in the same case.
GitHub
Repositories and admin tools the account never touched.
CrowdStrike
New software or an extension just before behavior shifts.
In a compromised-account case the employee is usually the victim. Above's job is to show that quickly, so the response goes after the attacker and the person isn't treated as a suspect.


“What you get with Above is like a storyline of intent. Above links together all of the alert and tooling that you already have in your organization and pieces it together in a nice, easily readable pack.”
Software, extensions and SaaS accounts IT never approved, and which ones carry risk.
Legitimate access used to steal, leak or sabotage. Above separates intent from the job and builds the record.
What AI agents did with the access they were given, who they acted for, and whether it matched the ask.
A compromised account is a legitimate user account controlled by someone else, through phishing, a stolen session, MFA fatigue or malware. The access is real; the person using it isn't. The Ponemon Institute counts credential theft as one of three insider incident types, beside negligent and malicious insiders.
You tell a compromised account from a malicious insider by comparing the activity with the person's own pattern. A new device, place or hours, behavior they have never shown, and the real owner working normally at the same time point to compromise. The same actions from their own laptop, during their day, point to the insider.
The SOC owns the response. Above gives it the insider context it usually lacks: what the person normally does, which access they hold and whether the activity fits their job. The SOC decides faster, and the employee isn't wrongly blamed.
Above works beside identity threat detection. It reads Okta, Entra, Google Workspace and Ping signals next to SaaS and endpoint evidence and investigates them as one case, so an identity alert arrives with what the person normally does, what the session touched and whether it fits their job.
See a compromised-account investigation from first prompt to verdict.
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