Departing employee data theft

People on their way out sometimes take customer lists, pricing or code with them, and the data usually moves before anyone knows they are leaving. Above's AI investigators connect the HR record, the files, the personal accounts and the AI tools into one case, so you know who took what before their last day.

An employee walks out of an office building's open door along a path, carrying a violet moving box of files.

INC-035A regional sales director

Confirmed threat

Accounts and pricing moved out before notice

  1. SalesforceFirst full account export
  2. Google DriveUploaded to personal Drive
  3. GmailPricing deck to personal Gmail

Response Preserve evidence, revoke personal sync

Why the weeks around a resignation matter

  • More than half

    of insiders who stole IP took at least some of it within 30 days of leaving. CERT, Carnegie Mellon SEI, 2012.

  • Most common

    Critical pattern in Above's investigations: data staged by someone on their way out. Above, 2026.

  • $19.5M

    average annual cost of insider incidents per organization. Ponemon Institute, 2026 Cost of Insider Risks.

Why departing employee data theft is hard to catch

“HR tells us on the day they hand in notice”

By then the export, the upload to a personal Drive and the paste into a personal AI account are already done. The resignation is the first alert, and it arrives last.

“Every step looks like their job”

Sellers export pipeline every week and engineers clone repositories every day. A volume rule fires on your busiest people and misses the one who takes a little at a time.

“Most of them take nothing”

About half of the leaver investigations Above confirms end with no IP moved. You need to clear those people quickly and fairly, without treating every resignation as a threat.

The pipeline export

The pipeline export

Above investigative agents

  • Timeline
  • Contextual analysis
  • Reasoning
  • Recommended actions

Ready for security, HR, and legal to act on together.

What the investigation hands you

Ready for security, HR, and legal to act on together.

The pipeline exportINC-035 · A regional sales director

Confirmed threat

Accounts and pricing moved out before notice

Each step is normal sales work on its own.

The evidence

  • Salesforce
  • Google Drive
  • Gmail
  • Workday

The first full account export, the upload to a personal Drive and the pricing deck sent to a personal Gmail, all before the resignation reached HR.

The response

  1. Preserve evidence
  2. Revoke personal sync
  3. Bring in HR and Legal before the last day

A human confirms

A departing engineer encrypts code into Claude

A leading AI research company's engineer encrypted source code and moved it out through a personal Claude account. No resignation had reached HR, so nothing looked like a departure.

A leading AI research companyCustomer story

Talk to a human, 30 minutes

A solutions engineer walks you through a real case.

How Above investigates a departure

  1. A resignation in Workday or HiBob, and the weeks before it.

  2. Personal Google, personal AI, a USB drive or a personal inbox.

  3. Handoffs and role exports are checked before anything reaches a person.

Watch a departing-employee case
  • Workday
  • HiBob
  • Google Calendar
  • Google Drive
  • Gmail
  • GitHub
  • ChatGPT
  • CrowdStrike

Evidence this investigation reads

The signals Above reads for departing employees

No single signal is a verdict.

Show the signals from
  • Resignation, notice and termination dates

    Workday, HiBob

    They set the window Above looks back across.

  • Exports that break the person's pattern

    Google Drive

    A first full CRM export, or one far larger.

  • Uploads to personal cloud storage

    Seen by the Above browser extension.

  • Work data in personal AI accounts

    ChatGPT, Claude

    ChatGPT or Claude on a personal account.

  • Repository clones outside current work

    GitHub

    Repositories untouched for months, cloned in bulk.

  • Mail to personal addresses

    Gmail, Microsoft Outlook

    Attachments sent to the person's own outside address.

  • Copies to USB and local folders

    CrowdStrike, Microsoft Defender

    Removable-media writes from your existing EDR.

  • AI notetakers in sensitive meetings

    Google Calendar

    Personal notetakers in pipeline, pricing or deal reviews (ITM IF034).

  • Grants that outlive the person

    Google Workspace, Microsoft Entra

    OAuth grants and agents still active after the account changes.

Fair to the people who are simply leaving

Most people who resign take nothing. Above treats a resignation as context. A job search or a recruiter message never opens a case on its own, and the person stays pseudonymized until a reviewer is authorized to see who they are.

  • Screen capture and keystroke logging are configurable by region, device, identity, identity group and risk score. Screenshots are evidence, taken under your policy.
  • Every unmask is logged, and HR and Legal see only the cases their role allows.
  • When nothing moved, the case says so in writing, and the person leaves with a clean record.

Related use cases

Malicious insider and IP theft

Legitimate access used to steal, leak or sabotage. Above separates intent from the job and builds the record.

  • Insider Risk during layoffs, reorgs and M&A

    Event-based reviews for the people and systems a big change affects, triggered by HR or Legal.

  • Shadow AI and AI data leakage

    Company data in personal AI accounts and custom GPTs, and how to adopt AI without the leak.

Questions about departing employee data theft

What is departing employee data theft?

It's an employee taking company data they aren't entitled to keep around the time they resign or are let go: customer lists, pricing, source code, deal documents. It usually means copying files to personal accounts, devices or AI tools, or forwarding them to a personal inbox. The Insider Threat Matrix™ files the motive as Leaver (MT003).

How do you detect an employee planning to leave with company data?

You detect an employee planning to leave with company data by reading the HR record beside where data goes. Above starts from resignation dates in Workday or HiBob, then looks for exports that break the person's pattern, uploads to personal cloud storage, personal AI accounts and unusual repository clones. A flight risk alone never opens a case.

Is an employee who is job hunting an Insider Risk?

Job hunting alone is not Insider Risk. A job search, a recruiter message or an interview is normal working life, and Above never opens a case on it. It becomes relevant only next to data moving somewhere it shouldn't, such as files uploaded to a personal Drive the week after an offer.

Why don't DLP and UEBA catch employees taking data before they leave?

DLP checks single events against rules, so it fires on the one large export and misses data that leaves a little at a time. UEBA flags change from a baseline, and a busy month before a move can look like strong performance. Neither knows the person resigned. Above reads the HR record, the data and its destination together.

What does Legal get from the case?

A dated, attributed chain: which files, from which system, to which destination, when, and from which account, with the reasoning behind the verdict and screenshots where your policy allows them. It is built to support Legal's next step. Whether and how it is used in a dispute is for your counsel to decide.

What does Above need to connect for this use case?

Your HR system (Workday, HiBob or Deel), your identity provider, the managed Above browser extension, and the SaaS and AI tools your people use, such as Google Drive, GitHub, Gmail and ChatGPT. Endpoint evidence such as USB writes comes from your existing EDR. The extension rolls out to managed browsers through your MDM.

Know who took what before their last day

We'll walk you through a departing-employee investigation.

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